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June 6, 2011 
Abstract 
Caseworkers at the Swedish Public Employment Office (PES) have an important role in 
helping the unemployed to find a job. In this study, I estimate the effect of caseworkers 
on jobseekers' future employment rates, earnings, and wages. To take into account that 
the average characteristics of the unemployed can vary between caseworkers, I only use 
information from local employment offices that randomly allocate caseworkers to 
clients. The results indicate that caseworkers have an effect on the jobseekers' future 
employment and earnings. For example, the probability of being employed within a 
year is about 13 percent higher if the caseworker is one standard deviation higher in the 
distribution of caseworkers. Distinctive of a successful caseworker is that they assist in 
job search rather than assigning their jobseekers to various training programs. 
Keywords: Caseworkers, program evaluation, active labour market policy 
JEL-codes: J68 
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2  IFAU - How important are caseworkers – and why? 1 Introduction 
Since the 1930s, an active labor market policy has been a fundamental component in the 
fight against unemployment in Sweden. This policy is based on measures that are 
directly aimed at the unemployed, such as job search assistance, classroom training, and 
various types of employment subsidies (see Calmfors et al, 2001 for an overview). 
These measures are administered and implemented at about 300 local employment 
offices, where unemployed can register to receive help with finding work.
1 At an office, 
the jobseeker is paired with a caseworker who functions as an agent between employers 
and prospective employees. The caseworker aids the jobseeker search and finds 
available positions in the appropriate job sector. Jobseekers may also be assigned to 
training programs, as well as controlled to make sure they stay active in their search for 
employment. 
The purpose of this study is to determine how important the individual caseworker is 
for jobseekers and what distinguishes successful caseworkers. I use data from 2002 to 
determine whether caseworker fixed effects explain the future labor market outcomes of 
the unemployed. In order to correctly measure the significance of caseworkers, it is 
critical to take into account that the proficiency of jobseekers varies among 
caseworkers. Such differences may occur if the personal characteristics of the 
unemployed and their possibilities of employment differ systematically between offices 
and caseworkers. 
I use two strategies to account for such differences between caseworkers. First, I will 
take advantage of the fact that some offices randomly – often according to day and 
month of birth – allocate caseworkers to jobseekers. Second, I use detailed registry data 
to eliminate observable differences between jobseekers at the same office. 
The results show that caseworkers have a significant effect on the probability of 
finding employment; approximately 2-5 percent of the variation in employment status 
and earnings one year after being registered at the Employment Service is determined 
by which caseworker the jobseeker is assigned. The effects are also relevant in terms of 
size: unemployed with a one standard deviation “better” caseworker in the distribution 
has, after approximately one year, a thirteen percent higher chance of being employed 
and twenty percent higher earnings. However, caseworkers have no clear effect on 
                                                 
1 Jobseekers have to register at the Employment office in order to become entitled to unemployment benefits.  
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productivity. 
Understanding why some caseworkers are more successful than others is compli-
cated since not all working methods can be observed in the data. The results show that 
caseworkers who offer basic help in the job search are more successful than those who 
send their clients to various training programs. However, strong assumptions are 
required for a causal interpretation of the results. 
Although no earlier studies have measured the overall significance of caseworkers, 
several studies show that caseworkers affect their jobseekers' success on the labor 
market. For example, studies show that assisting the unemployed in their search for 
work has positive effects. Delander (1978) found that a group of randomly selected 
individuals who received extra support had significantly higher employment rates and 
wages than individuals in a control group. Similar conclusions were reached by 
Engström et al (1998), who studied the unemployed after a plant closure where certain 
individuals received more support than others. Many international studies are in line 
with such positive effects of extra assistance in the search for employment (see Martin 
and Grubb, 2001). 
The rest of this study is arranged according to the following: Chapter 2 shows in 
more detail how caseworkers can affect the jobseekers' employment possibilities. In 
chapter 3, I explain how I measure the significance of caseworkers and introduce the 
data set used in the study. Chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis, while the final 
chapter will summarize the main conclusions. 
2  What do caseworkers do? 
A fundamental question at this stage is how do caseworkers affect the jobseekers' 
chances on the labor market. Intuitively, one could say caseworkers differ with respect 
to their professionalism – e.g. contacts to various companies – and their personal 
characteristics – e.g ability to motivate. The more freedom a caseworker has with his 
clients, the larger the effect of these attributes. 
In 2003, I interviewed caseworkers at 30 offices in order to determine how much 
freedom they have in allocating jobseekers for specific labor market policy programs. In 
most cases there are clear selection criteria; e.g. age limits determine eligibility to 
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pation in long-term unemployment programs. However, many caseworkers claim that 
they can influence which programs their clients join. National guidelines are seen as 
unclear and recommendations often contradict each other. For example, caseworkers are 
recommended to support struggling groups, while some programs, at the same time, 
explicitly require a percentage of participants to be employed after a certain amount of 
time. 
Several earlier studies also point out that caseworkers have an influence on which 
activities and programs their clients participate in (Lundin, 2004; Bell and Orr, 2002; 
Richardson and van den Berg, 2001). Eriksson (1997) found that according to Swedish 
data, participation in a program is more accurately predicted by which caseworker a 
jobseeker has rather than the personal characteristics of the jobseeker. In the same vein 
Lechner and Smith (2003) state that many Swiss caseworkers fail in selecting a suitable 
participant for programs; they suggest that it is more effective to select program 
participants based on statistically predicted impacts. A reason why caseworkers operate 
differently could be that they can choose between maximizing social goals and ensuring 
the success of a program (Heckman et al, 1999). In order for a program to be seen as 
effective, caseworkers may select participants with the best chance of finding 
employment, even if the program is more suitable for other types of participants. 
3  Empirical strategy and data 
In order to measure how caseworkers affect jobseekers' probability of finding work, it is 
necessary to control for additional factors that may have an effect on labor market 
prospects and vary across jobseekers with different caseworkers. While some case-
workers seem to be more successful than others, it is not necessarily due to them being 
more skilled; the work environment of the caseworker and the background of the 
jobseeker can have an effect. In this chapter, I will explain how I account for such 
differences, and present the data set used in the analysis. 
3.1  Determining the importance of caseworkers 
The first approach for estimating the importance of caseworkers is to use regression 
analysis and detailed registry data to take into account the effects of observable 
characteristics of jobseekers. The following model is estimated: 
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where      is the outcome for jobseeker i who is assigned to caseworker c at the office 
o;    is a vector with detailed information about the jobseeker's personal characteristics. 
These include controls for age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, region of residence, 
length of unemployment, highest level of completed education, and field of highest 
education. The variables of most interest in (1) are the caseworker fixed effects,    . 
However, to give these a causal interpretation requires that the specification captures all 
the systematic differences between jobseekers with different caseworkers. 
In another approach, (1) is estimated solely for local employment offices that are 
using random allocation of caseworkers to jobseekers. In 2003, I contacted managers at 
244 local offices and requested them to explain the process by which caseworkers were 
allocated to jobseekers. 86 percent responded to the request. The majority of offices – 
approximately 70 percent – had caseworkers that are specialized for specific groups of 
jobseekers; profession, age, and previous unemployment are examples of factors that 
determine how caseworkers are assigned. The number of offices that randomly allocated 
jobseekers to caseworkers was 69. One such method is the “date principle”, whereby 
caseworkers are assigned according to the jobseekers' date of birth. For example, 
caseworker A is assigned persons born on days 1-15, while caseworker B receives 
persons born on days 16-31. However, some groups of jobseekers – long-term 
unemployed, youths, and handicapped – usually have caseworkers who are specialized 
for their specific needs, making it hard to evaluate how successful these caseworkers 
are. Therefore, I exclude jobseekers that have previously been registered at the 
Employment Service as unemployed, as well as jobseekers that are younger than 25 or 
have a handicap. 
Now the crucial question is whether the employment offices claiming to use a 
randomized procedure in fact succeed in implementing such a policy. I use two 
strategies to empirically assess if allocation at these offices was indeed random. First, 
there is only a small within-office variation in the number of jobseekers per caseworker. 
Second, including caseworker dummies in regressions explaining the gender, age or 
ethnic origin of the jobseekers do not increase the explanatory power of the models. 
Together, these patterns support the view that these offices did indeed practice random 
allocation. 
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with different caseworkers should have on average the same personal characteristics. I 
will continue, however, to include    in the model for two reasons: (1) In practice, some 
caseworkers have so few jobseekers that systematic differences between caseworkers' 
clients may occur.
2 (2) Eliminating the effect of varying characteristics among 
jobseekers enables the estimation of the caseworker fixed effects with greater precision. 
3.2  Descriptive statistics of the data material 
The analysis is based on all individuals in Sweden who registered as unemployed at the 
Employment Service in 2002. I use Swedish registry data from the Swedish National 
Labor Market Board (AMS) and Statistics Sweden (SCB). The AMS data contains date 
of registration at PES and information on which office the individual registered in and 
which caseworker she was assigned. 
I am excluding jobseekers who 1) are younger than 26 years old or older than 65 
years old, 2) have earlier been registered at the Employment Office (since 1991), or 3) 
have a handicap that makes them unsuitable for the labor market. The reason for 
excluding these groups from the analysis is that they often receive caseworkers who are 
specialized for their needs. The finalized data set that the study uses consists of 11 836 
jobseekers. 
For these individuals, I add detailed information from the SCB registry data that 
covers the entire adult population of Sweden. I include the following variables: age, 
gender, region of residence, marital status, citizenship, field of education, and highest 
level of completed education. I use four different outcome measures to determine the 
jobseekers success on the labor market.  First, I use a binary variable with the value 1 if 
the individual is employed in November 2003. Second, I create a binary variable with 
the value 1 if the person has de-registered from PES before November 2005 due to 
having found regular employment. Third, I am using (log) earnings in 2003 and fourth, 
the jobseeker's (log) monthly salary for September 2003. However, salary information is 
only available for public-sector employees and employees in companies with more than 
500 employees. Table 1 gives a summary of the descriptive statistics for the data set. 
  
                                                 
2 As a robustness check, I study caseworkers with many clients. This increases the likelihood that there are no 
systematic differences in client characteristics between caseworkers (see Section 4.2). 
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  Random   All offices  Full population 
      
Outcome variables:      
Employed in November 2003   0.54  0.54  0.61 
De-registered from PES prior to November 2005 
due to regular employment 
0.64 0.63 0.69 
Earnings 2003 (SEK)  111 398  111 480  97 953 
Personal characteristics: 
   
Age (years)  42.7  43.0  35.6 
Female 0.50  0.49  0.53 
Married/Living with a partner  0.59  0.60  0.39 
Swedish citizenship  0.79  0.79  0.90 
Highest level of completed education: 
  Primary 
  Secondary 














Number of individuals  11 836  33 385  675 056 
Number of individuals per caseworker  12.0  15.5  313.5 
Number of individuals per office  171.5  136.8  2777.6 
Number of offices  69  244  244 
      
Note: Descriptive statistics of all unemployed ages 25-65 who registered at PES in 2002 but have not previously 
registered as unemployed. Column 1 includes only jobseekers with these characteristics registered at offices that 
randomly allocate caseworkers to jobseekers. Column 2 includes jobseekers with these characteristics at all offices. 
Column 3 shows the characteristics of the full population of individuals registered at PES in 2002. 
 
Table 1 shows that offices that assign caseworkers randomly differ from the ones that 
do not. Column 1 displays the descriptive statistics for unemployed who registered 
themselves in 2002 at offices that use randomized allocation and fulfill the required 
criteria. Column 2 shows statistics for similar types of jobseekers registered at all 
offices, while column 3 shows the stock of all jobseekers registered at all offices. 
As seen in Table 1, offices with a randomized allocation have more registered 
jobseekers and fewer jobseekers per caseworker. There do not seem to be any clear 
differences in the jobseekers' characteristics or later success on the labor market. It also 
shows that the data set used in the empirical analysis is not representative of all 
registered jobseekers during the period; unemployed are generally younger and less 
educated than the group used in this study. 
4 Results 
The results of this study are presented in this chapter, which show that caseworkers 
have a statistically significant effect on the jobseekers' employment rates and future 
earnings. Following this, I will analyze the size of the effects to determine if being 
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concluded with an analysis of which working methods successful caseworkers use. 
4.1  Caseworker fixed effects 
The jobseekers that are included in the analysis were registered as unemployed in 2002. 
I determine whether caseworkers have a significant effect on four different outcomes for 
jobseekers: 1) the probability of being employed in September 2003; 2) the probability 
of being employed in September 2005; 3) log earnings for 2003; and 4) log wages in 
September 2003. 
I begin by only including unemployed registered at offices that use randomized 
allocation of clients to caseworkers. In Table 2, I present the adjusted R²-value when 
specification (1) is estimated with and without the caseworker fixed effects. The model 
is estimated using OLS. An F-test is also reported, which shows to which extent 
caseworkers as a group account for the respective outcome variables. 
Table 2. Estimates of caseworker fixed effects, offices with random allocation of 
caseworkers to clients 








          
Caseworker fixed effects  No  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
          
Observations  11 836  11 836  11 836  11 836  8 270  8 270  2 954  2 954 
          
R-squared adjusted  0.1678  0.2056  0.1344 0.1861 0.0957 0.1337 0.3280 0.3244 
            
F-test on fixed effects for 
caseworkers 
 1.590  2.030  1.397  0.974 
p-value   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.655 
          
Note: Specification (1) is estimated using the ordinary least square model. Controls for all variables in Table 1 are 
included in addition to controls for county of residence, field of education, and length of unemployment. The 
outcome variable in column 1 is 1 if the individual is employed in November 2003 (0 otherwise); in column 2 the 
outcome is 1 if the individual has de-registered from PES prior to November 2005 due to a regular job (0 otherwise). 
Earnings and wages, respectively, denote log earnings during 2003 (only for individuals with earnings>0) and log 
wages in September 2003 (only for individuals with wages>0). 
 
The results show that caseworkers have a statistically significant effect on earnings and 
both short and long-term employment rates. Including the caseworker fixed effects in 
the model results in the adjusted R²-value increasing by approximately four percentage 
points; however, no such increase is evident for wages. 
Column 1 in Table 2 shows that caseworkers affect the probability of these 
individuals being employed in September 2003; the F-test shows that the caseworker 
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the jobseekers' probability of being employed in the long-term; the F-test is statistically 
significant when employment in November 2005 is used as an outcome. The results for 
earnings a year after being registered at PES are presented in column 3. We can observe 
that the model's explanatory power increases significantly when the caseworker fixed 
effects are included. Contrarily, the wages shown in column 4 are not affected by 
caseworkers. A possible reason to this could be that caseworkers affect primarily 
employment status and number of working hours. However, it could also be due to the 
wage effects being estimated from a smaller data set, as information on wages is only 
available for employees in the public sector and in companies with over 500 employees. 
An alternative method for determining caseworkers' significance is to estimate the 
same specification but include the unemployed at all employment offices. These results 
are based on the assumption that specification (1) successfully takes into account all the 
systematic variations between jobseekers with different caseworkers. As before, I am 
including only unemployed ages 25-65, who are not handicapped or previously 
registered as unemployed. Table 3 shows the results. 
Table 3. Estimates of caseworker fixed effects, all offices 








          
Caseworker fixed effects  No  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
          
Observations  33 385  33 385  33 385  33 385  23 482  23 482  8 325  8 325 
          
R-squared adjusted  0.1634  0.1887  0.1390 0.1788 0.1074 0.1321 0.3343 0.3345 
            
F-test on fixed effects for 
caseworkers 
 1.491  1.805  1.379  1.000 
p-value   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.492 
          
Note: Specification (1) is estimated using the ordinary least square model. Controls for all variables in Table 1 are 
included in addition to controls for county of residence, field of education, and length of unemployment. The 
outcome variable in column 1 is 1 if the individual is employed in November 2003 (0 otherwise); in column 2 the 
outcome is 1 if the individual has de-registered from PES prior to November 2005 due to a regular job (0 otherwise). 
Earnings and wages, respectively, denote log earnings during 2003 (only for individuals with earnings>0) and log 
wages in September 2003 (only for individuals with wages>0). 
 
These show a similar pattern; i.e. caseworkers have a significant effect on future 
employment and earnings, but wages are not affected. Surprisingly, the addition of the 
caseworker fixed effects leads to a smaller increase of the adjusted R²-value when all 
offices are included in the analysis. A potential explanation for this is that the average 
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number of jobseekers per caseworker is higher when all offices are included. If the 
number of jobseekers per caseworker is small, a few good or bad clients can have a 
large effect on the estimated caseworker fixed effects (see Rockoff, 2004). 
4.2 Sensitivity  analysis 
To determine whether the results are robust, I have done more analysis on caseworkers 
with numerous clients. I have also estimated a more flexible model, as well as studied if 
caseworkers had a significant effect during other periods of time as well. These results 
are presented in Table 4. 
In panel A, only caseworkers with more than 40 clients are included, which reduces 
the risk of the caseworker fixed effects capturing remaining non-observable differences 
among the unemployed that belong to different caseworkers. When I exclude 
caseworkers with few jobseekers, caseworkers as a group explain slightly less of the 
total variation, but the effects are still significant. 
A possible objection to the results could be that the model is not flexible enough to 
correctly capture any remaining differences between jobseekers with different 
caseworkers. Therefore, panel B shows the results from specification (1), which has 
been expanded to include a number of interaction effects. These include interactions 
between gender and education, age and education, and length of unemployment and age 
and gender. Using this more flexible form does not affect the conclusion that 
caseworkers have a significant effect on future employment and earnings. 
Another question could be whether these results are valid during other periods, and 
for other types of jobseekers than those that are included in the data set. Therefore, I 
have investigated if caseworkers affected the outcomes of their jobseekers who 
registered in another period. Panel C shows that these caseworkers had a statistically 
significant effect on the jobseekers that registered at PES during 2001; however, it is not 
possible to exclude the possibility that the results would be different during other phases 
in the business cycle. Also, Table 1 showed that individuals in the study are older and 
more educated than the unemployed in general; therefore, it is not certain that 
caseworkers have the same effect on other types of jobseekers. It is, however, not clear 
why caseworkers would be less important for the long-term unemployed, handicapped, 
or youths than for the jobseekers in this study.  
 
Table 4. Estimates of caseworker fixed effects, offices with random allocation of caseworkers to clients 
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Caseworkers with >40 clients 
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B. 
More flexible functional form 
Caseworker fixed effects 
Observations 
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C. 
Other time period (2001) 
Caseworker fixed effects 
Observations 
R-squared adjusted  


























Note: Specification (1) is estimated using the ordinary least square model. Controls for all variables in Table 1 are included in addition to controls for county of residence, field of 
education, and length of unemployment. The outcome variables are binary variables with the value 1 if the jobseeker is employed in November 2003 and November 2005, respectively. 
In the last column the outcome is log earnings in 2003 (only for individuals with earnings>0). In Panel C, the outcome variables are employment in November 2002, employment in 
November 2004 and earnings in 2002.
    
4.3  Do differences between caseworkers matter? 
The analysis has so far shown that caseworkers have a statistically significant effect on 
both the jobseekers' future employment and earnings. An additional question that could 
be asked is whether these effects are also economically significant. Therefore, I analyze 
the distribution of caseworker fixed effects: For example, how much more likely is it to 
find employment within a year if the caseworker belongs to the upper half of the 
distribution rather than the lower? 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics in the form of the median and the standard 
deviation for each distribution of caseworker fixed effects that were estimated in (1).
3 
One problem when assessing the impact of the effects is that the variation of the 
estimated caseworker effects also capture random sampling variation and therefore 
overestimates the true variation in caseworker fixed effects. I take this into account by 
using a shrinkage estimator that is used, for instance, in Leigh (2010), and explained in 
Rockoff (2004) and Thompson and Sharp (1999). This results in the adjusted standard 
deviations which are shown in the table, along with the unadjusted standard deviations. 
Noteworthy here is that the adjusted standard deviations are approximately 30-45 
percent smaller than the unadjusted. 
Table 5. Size distribution of caseworker fixed effects 




      
Employment (November 2003)  0.001  0.070  0.113 
    
Employment (November 2005)  0.005  0.094  0.129 
    
Earnings (2003)  0.040  0.206  0.365 
      
Note: The fixed effects are retrieved from the regressions reported in Table 2. Column 1 reports the median fixed 
effect for each outcome variable. Column 2 reports the standard deviation of the fixed effects adjusted for estimation 
error, whereas column 3 reports the unadjusted standard deviation of the fixed effects. 
 
The unemployed in the data set registered themselves at the PES in 2002. The first 
outcome measure captures whether the individual is employed in November 2003. The 
adjusted standard deviation in this case is 0.07; thus, moving one standard deviation up 
in the distribution of caseworkers results in a 7 percentage points higher probability of 
                                                 
3 Previous sections showed that caseworkers have no significant impact on wages. Therefore, Table 5 only reports 
size distributions of caseworker fixed effects from employment and earnings regressions.  
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this moment, the effect corresponds to an increase of about 13 percent. 
Caseworkers also have an economically significant effect on employment rates in the 
long-term: the probability of the individual being de-registered from the PES by 
November 2005 due to having found regular employment is 9 percentage points 
(equivalent to 14 percent) higher if the caseworker is situated one standard deviation 
higher in the distribution. When it comes to earnings for 2003, we can observe that 
unemployed with caseworkers that are situated one standard deviation higher up in the 
distribution have approximately 20 percent higher earnings for the year. 
4.4  What distinguishes successful caseworkers? 
As shown, caseworkers have a significant effect on the future employment rates and 
earnings of jobseekers, but why are some caseworkers more successful than others? By 
analyzing how caseworkers worked with the clients in the data set, we can get an 
indication for the answer. The PES has information on which programs each jobseeker 
participated in. Additionally, information on the geographical search area and the 
amount of jobs that the caseworker assigned to their client is also included. The first 
column in Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for unemployed sample individuals 
who are registered at offices that allocate caseworkers randomly, while the second 
column includes unemployed sample individuals at all offices. 
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Number of jobseekers  11 836  33 385 
Number of caseworkers  990  2 155 
Number of offices   69  244 
    
Note: Descriptive statistics of all unemployed ages 25-65 who registered at PES in 2002 but have not previously 
registered as unemployed. Column 1 includes only jobseekers with these characteristics registered at offices that 
randomly allocate caseworkers to clients. Column 2 includes jobseekers with these characteristics at all offices. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
In order to simplify the results, I have divided the policy programs into three categories 
according to what can be considered an international standard (Heckman et al, 1999). 
The programs are arranged in the table according to the amount of training included.
4 
Column 1 shows that approximately 14 percent of the unemployed in the study 
participated in programs with a focus on classroom training services, while around 8 
percent participated in programs with wage and employment subsidies and 2 percent 
received funding to start their own companies. Most jobseekers search for employment 
in their local region. The amount of assigned jobs was very low – on average only 0.5. 
                                                 
4 Carling and Richardson (2004) describe the programs in more detail.  
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offices where caseworkers are allocated randomly and those that do so systematically. 
The standard deviations indicate that working methods vary greatly between 
caseworkers. A closer look indicates that one in four caseworkers sends one fourth of 
their clients to programs consisting of classroom training, while the same fraction of 
caseworkers assign none of their clients to these programs. The existence of large 
differences in working methods could be an explanation why some caseworkers appear 
to be more successful than others. Therefore, I study if there is a link between 
caseworkers' working methods and their success.
5 The following link is estimated: 
 
( ) c c ε τ + = c S f ˆ  ,      (2) 
 
where τˆ  is the predicted caseworker fixed effects from (1) for caseworker c, S is the 
caseworker's working methods (such as the number of allocated jobs), and ε  is a 
residual that captures all the remaining factors that affect the caseworker fixed effects. 
Giving the results of the estimation of (2) a causal interpretation is dubious.   
Caseworkers affect their clients in several ways, of which only a few can be observed in 
the data. For example, caseworkers could improve their clients' chances of finding work 
by both assigning them to a program and by motivating them to search more 
intensively. If caseworkers who are proficient at motivating also assign many of their 
clients to programs, specification (2) has to take into account differences in caseworker 
motivation skills in order to not attribute the effect solely to the programs. 
A potential method to mitigate this problem is to utilize information on how 
caseworkers have worked with other jobseekers during earlier time periods, and then 
analyze the correlation between these caseworker specific time-invariant strategies and 
the estimated caseworker fixed effects from Table 2.
6 
The first step is to estimate how inclined each caseworker has been to try different 
work strategies during earlier years. I use data from 2001 and estimate – for each 
observable work strategy – the following model by OLS: 
 
2001 , 2001 , 2001 , 0 2001 , ico co i ico X S υ π θ λ + + + =  ,      (3) 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately, the data has no information on caseworker characteristics, such as qualifications and experience.   
6 A similar kind of identification strategy is used by Frölich and Lechner (2004) to estimate the importance of 
caseworkers and by Sweetman et al (2003) to investigate the effect of receiving disability insurance.  
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at office o used the strategy in 2001;   ,     is the same vector with the personal 
characteristics that were used earlier in the analysis and   is a residual that captures all 
remaining factors that affect the probability of the individual participating in the 
strategy. The caseworker fixed effects,    ,    , capture the differences between 
caseworkers' strategy preferences. Table 7 shows to what extent these caseworker fixed 
effects can predict which measures jobseekers at the PES participate in. 
Table 7. Linear probability models of working strategies 
  F-test (caseworkers)  p-value 
Program assignments:
  
Classroom training services  3.310  0.00 
Wage and employment subsidies  2.511  0.00 
Self-employment services  3.901  0.00 
Job assignments:    
Applying for work outside the close vicinity of home  1.224  0.00 
Number of job assignments  1.220  0.00 
Number of jobseekers  10 187   
Number of caseworkers  1 173   
Number of offices  69   
    
Note: The outcome variables are the probabilities of participating in the programs and the number of job assignments. 
Controls for caseworker fixed effects and a vector of all variables in Section 3 are included. The individuals are all 
unemployed ages 25-60 who registered at PES in 2001 but have not previously registered as unemployed. Only 
offices that randomly allocate caseworkers to clients are included. 
 
Table 7 shows that the caseworker fixed effects have a significant effect on the 
probability of participating in various types of programs and the probability of being 
assigned to an expanded search, as well as the amount of jobs assigned. However, it 
should be stressed that the effects are not large; caseworkers can only account for a 
small part of the total variation in work strategies. 
With the help of caseworker fixed effects from (3), I will now predict the probability 
of participating in each strategy. In other words: To what degree is the probability of 
participating in a measure influenced by the caseworker that the client was randomly 
assigned to? Following this, I will study the link between a caseworker's success – 
measured as caseworker fixed effects from (1) – and their inclination to use each 
strategy.
7 Therefore, I estimate specification (4) by OLS and present the results in Table 
8. 
                                                 
7 Since the first step equation uses individuals in the previous year, only individuals with caseworkers working in 
both years are used in the analysis.  
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Table 8. Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the caseworker fixed effects 
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Number of observations  819  819  761 
R-squared 0.045  0.102  0.051 
      
Note: Specification (4) estimated using the ordinary least square model. The dependent variables in the columns are 
the predicted caseworkers fixed effects from (1). The explanatory variables are the predicted working strategies using 
only the caseworker vector from equation (3). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 8 shows that the caseworker who send their clients to classroom training services 
are less successful than those that do not assign to programs but choose instead to 
support and help their clients in their search for employment. The effect is significant in 
both the short and long-term employment rates, as well as for earnings one year after 
registering at the PES. The results are, however, not statistically significant for the other 
strategies. 
These results agree with several previous evaluations of program effects (see Carling 
and Richardson, 2004, for an overview). Many evaluations of classroom training 
programs find insignificant or significantly negative effects. Calmfors et al (2001) 
summarize the literature and conclude that classroom training programs in the 1990s did 
not improve the participants' chances of finding employment, whereas some forms of 
subsidized employment seem to have had positive effects. However, it is important to 
note that a causal interpretation of the results in Table 8 is based on strong assumptions 
and that the results therefore should be interpreted carefully. It must be the case that 
18  IFAU - How important are caseworkers – and why? unobservable time-invariant caseworker strategies do not affect the jobseekers’ chances 
of finding work or that these are uncorrelated with observable constant working 
strategies. 
5 Conclusions 
Caseworkers at the Employment Service are often considered key in helping jobseekers 
to find appropriate employment. I base the analysis on individuals who registered as 
unemployed in 2002, and investigate if caseworkers have a significant effect of these 
jobseekers' future employment rates, earnings, and wages. To take into account that the 
average characteristics of the unemployed can vary between caseworkers, I use 
information from offices that randomly allocate caseworkers to clients, and include 
detailed controls in a regression framework. The study finds that caseworkers have a 
clear effect on the jobseekers' future employment rates and earnings; about 2-5 percent 
of the variation in employment status and earnings one year after being registered at the 
Employment Service is determined by which caseworker the jobseeker is assigned to. 
The effects are also relevant in terms of size: unemployed with a caseworker who is 
situated one standard deviation higher in the distribution has, after approximately one 
year, a thirteen percent higher chance of being employed and twenty percent higher 
earnings. However, the data does not show any effects on wages. 
Understanding why caseworkers matter is harder since only few working strategies 
can be observed in the data. Interviews show that caseworkers find themselves with a 
discretionary power to decide how to work with their clients, which is supported in the 
data showing a large variation across caseworkers in the way they provide placement 
services and assign clients to programs. The results show that caseworkers who assign 
their clients to classroom training programs tend to not be as successful as those who 
concentrate on supporting their clients in the actual process of searching for work. 
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